Human Rights, International Law and Domestic Courts by Re, Judge Edward D.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 70 
Number 1 Volume 70, Winter 1996, Number 1 Article 7 
March 2012 
Human Rights, International Law and Domestic Courts 
Judge Edward D. Re 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Re, Judge Edward D. (1996) "Human Rights, International Law and Domestic Courts," St. John's Law 
Review: Vol. 70 : No. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol70/iss1/7 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DOMESTIC COURTS
JUDGE EDWARD D. RE*
GREETINGS
Father Harrington, Reverend Members of the Clergy, Emi-
nent Jurists, Distinguished Public Officials, Dean Hasl, Mem-
bers of the Faculty, Alumni and Friends of St. John's.
Permit me at the outset to extend a special welcome to all of
our foreign guests to the United States, the great City of New
York and St. John's University. It is with great pleasure and
pride that I welcome our renowned participants in this Round-
table. Of course, I refer to the distinguished jurists who honor
us with their presence: Hon. Antonio Brancaccio, Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy; Hon. Pierre Drai, Chief
Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation of France; Hon. Giovanni E.
Longo, President of Division, Supreme Court of Cassation of It-
aly; and Hon. Brian Walsh, Justice, European Court of Human
Rights, former Justice, Supreme Court of Ireland.
A special word of gratitude is due to my dear friend and col-
league, His Excellency Justice Giovanni Longo, for his invaluable
contribution in the selection of the distinguished panelists. May
I add that Justice Longo also serves as Secretary General of the
Union Internationale des Magistrats (International Association
of Judges).
*© Copyright by Edward D. Re, 1994.
Chief Judge Emeritus of the United States Court of International Trade and Distin-
guished Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Judge Re was
Chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States and
Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs. He served as Chair
for the American Bar Association's Section of International and Comparative Law,
as President of the American Society of Comparative Law and is a Member Emeri-
tus of the Board of Higher Education of the City of New York. Effective December
15, 1993, the International Association of Judges appointed Judge Re as its Princi-
pal Representative to the United Nations. On January 13, 1994, Chief Justice
Rehnquist appointed Judge Re a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee
on International Judicial Relations.
ST. JOHN'S LA W RE VIE W
I also wish to thank all of the judges, members of the faculty
and alumni who are in the audience, and who will take part in
this panel discussion. All of you will help make this portion of
our rededication ceremonies both intellectually stimulating and
memorable.
I. INTRODUCTION
The theme of our Conference holds great meaning for free-
dom-loving people everywhere. The subject of our deliberations
deals with the role of law and the role of the courts in effectuat-
ing human rights. Although we will discuss international law,
our primary concern is the role of domestic courts in giving effect
to human rights and fundamental freedoms as enforceable legal
norms.
Although human rights as ideals continue to be the concern
of philosophers, jurists must consider and ascertain which of the
ideals that may be described as fundamental human rights are
legally enforceable. Are the ideals merely moral norms, or are
they legal rights to be legally enforced? It is to be noted at the
beginning of our deliberations that, when we acknowledge the
existence of human rights, we have also admitted that there are
limitations upon the power of government. Hence, individuals
enjoy certain human rights that governments have a duty to re-
spect.
On the international level, the existence of human rights
implies a limitation upon the unfettered sovereignty of states,1 as
See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights
and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse
with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices which human-
ity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a re-
laxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that
absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which
sovereignty confers.
Id. at 136; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that deliber-
ate torture under color of authority violates accepted international standards); see
also Jeffrey A. Blair & Karen E.M. Parker, Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act and International Human Rights Agreements: How They Co-Exist, 17
U.S.F. L. REV. 71 (1982). The Comment suggests that under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (see infra note 39) foreign governments may be precluded
from asserting immunity from U.S. jurisdiction in circumstances where they are
being sued for human rights violations. Id. at 72. Countries which are signatories to
international agreements may not claim immunity if the act for which they have
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well as a duty upon nations to respect these rights.2 Our subject,
therefore, does not deal merely with abstract ideals, but with the
enforcement of those ideals. It does not deal merely with human
rights as moral or ethical norms, but with human rights as le-
gally enforceable norms. It is interesting to note that the great
Roman jurist Ulpian, commenting upon the distinction between
rights as ideals and rights to be realized, asserted that the law is
the "true philosophy."3 In his view, since law "was based on rea-
son and served the ideal of justice for all," it is the lawyer who
pursues the calling of the true "philosopher." In his view, there-
fore, the study of law was the highest form of "philosophy" be-
cause it is the law that "gives to notions of right and wrong a
concrete, [and] practical form."5
As I have noted, the very notion of the existence of human
rights of individuals implies a restriction upon the power of
states and governments.6 The American Declaration of Inde-
pendence, after proclaiming as self-evident certain unalienable
rights, declares that governments are instituted to "secure these
rights."7 For the United States, therefore, to guarantee funda-
mental human rights, is to be faithful to its founding document
and the Bill of Rights. Much of this American political philoso-
been sued violates one of those agreements. Id. Similarly, if the foreign country has
signed the United Nations Charter, it has waived immunity from U.S. jurisdiction
in human rights actions. Id. See generally, Joseph Diab, Note, United States Ratifi-
cation of the American Convention on Human Rights, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
323 (1992)(urging American committment and acceptance of human rights norms).
"The principle of noninterference in domestic affairs does not shield states from
scrutiny or censure should they torture, murder or arbitrarily imprison their citi-
zens." Id. at 336.
2 See Arthur J. Goldberg, The Need for a World Court of Human Rights, 11
HOW. L.J. 621 (1965). "[Tlhere is no sovereign right of any state large or small to
deny the fundamental Rights of Man-rights which belong to him because as a child
of God he is endowed with human dignity." Id. See also Richard B. Bilder, An Over-
view of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE To INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICE 3, 3-19 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1984). "The international human
rights movement is based on the concept that every nation has an obligation to re-
spect the human rights of its citizens, and that other nations and the international
community have a right, and responsibility, to protest if this obligation is not lived
up to." Id. at 3.
3 TONY HONOR, ULPIAN 30-31 (1982) (citations omitted).
4 Id. at 31.
'Id.
'See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
7THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). When a government
is guilty of destroying "certain unalienable rights," it is the right and duty of the
people to alter or abolish and replace that government. Id.
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phy undoubtedly influenced the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.8 Regardless of the underlying basis, no nation today may
claim the sovereign right to violate universal rights deemed to be
fundamental or unalienable.9 Hence, because of the acceptance
of international legal norms in the area of human rights, the ef-
fort today is not merely to assert fundamental rights and free-
doms to which human beings are entitled, but rather to
strengthen the enforcement mechanisms that exist to give these
rights vitality and make them a reality.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Many of these fundamental human rights are at the heart of
modern international law." For Americans, it is important to
remember that international law is part of the law of the land."
8 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 71-77, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948), reprinted in JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 165
(1993) [hereinafter "Universal Declaration"]. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration
states that "[elveryone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person." Id. at
166. Also compare Article 12 of the Universal Declaration ("No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence
..") with the Bill of Rights in U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated ... ."). See also Louis Henkin, Rights: American
and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 415 (April 1979) ("[Mlost of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, are in their essence American constitutional rights projected
around the world."). In the past, the United States has been a leader and major
sponsor in promoting human rights efforts in the international arena. Diab, supra
note 1, at 324.
9 See Goldberg, supra note 2.
10 See Edward D. Re, Freedom in the International Society, in CONCEPT OF
FREEDOM 217, 257 (Carl W. Grindel ed., 1955), referring to the numerous liberties
preserved by the Universal Declaration:
The thirty articles of the Declaration proclaim the right to life, liberty and
security of person, freedom from slavery, torture, cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment, freedom from arbitrary arrest, deten-
tion or exile ... freedom to leave any country, freedom of movement and
residence, right of asylum from persecution, equal rights as to marriage ...
freedom of religion, expression, assembly, association ... right to work ...
right to rest and leisure ... right to equality before the law, and freedom
from discrimination.
Id.
" The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). "International law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropri-
ate jurisdiction ... " Id. at 700; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[A]ll Treaties made ...
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ...
."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1986) ("International
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Justice Harry Blackmun, at a recent speech before the American
Society of International Law, spoke about "the Supreme Court,
the law of nations, and the place in American jurisprudence for
what the drafters of the Declaration of Independence termed 'a
decent respect to the opinions of mankind."12 Justice Blackmun
noted:
The early architects of our nation were experienced diplomats
who appreciated that the law of nations was binding on the
United States. John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United
States, observed, in a case called Chisolm v. Georgia, that the
United States "had, by taking a place among the nations of the
earth, become amenable to the laws of nations." Although the
Constitution, by Art. I, § 8, cl.1O, gives Congress the power to
"define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations," and
by Art. VI, cl.2, identifies treaties as part of "the supreme Law of
the Land," the task of further defining the role of international
law in the nation's legal fabric has fallen to the courts."13
After indicating that "[several first principles have been
established,"" Justice Blackmun stated:
As early as 1804, the Supreme Court recognized that "an act
of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of na-
tions if any other possible construction remains." In a trilogy of
cases in the 1880s, the Court established that treaties are on
equal footing with federal statutes and that, where a treaty and
statute cannot be reconciled, the later in time is controlling. 5
Of particular importance to us is Justice Blackmun's dis-
cussion of the now classic case, The Paquete Habana,6 where he
noted:
[Tihe Supreme Court addressed the power of courts to enforce
customary international law. In invalidating the wartime sei-
zure of fishing vessels as contrary to the law of nations, the
Court observed: "International aw is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts." Where no
law and international agreements of the United States are the law of the United
States and supreme over the law of the several States."); Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1980).
12Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent Re-
spect to the Opinions of Mankind, Address Before the ASIL, in ASIL (Am. Soc'y Intl
L., Wash., D.C.), March-May 1994, at 1.
13 Id. at 1 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
14 Id.
'5 Id. at 1, 6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
" 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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treaty or other legal authority is controlling, resort must be had
to the customs of nations.17
Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded by asserting that "[t]hese
early principles established during the Supreme Court's first
century continue to define the relationship between the law of
nations and domestic American law." 8 After introducing his
subject as indicated above, Justice Blackmun announced the
subject of his talk by stating that he wished to consider "the
Supreme Court's application of these principles in four of the
Court's recent cases."9 A word about each of these cases0 may
be useful.
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,2 the Court held that
the forced abduction of a Mexican national by United States
agents did not violate a United States-Mexico extradition
treaty." Dr. Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped in Mexico and
brought to the U.S. to stand trial for murder.23 Justice Black-
mun, who was one of the three dissenting Justices, argued that
"[t]ransborder kidnaping" contravened the very "spirit and pur-
pose" of the treaty, which was to "preserve the territorial integ-
rity of nations, protect individuals from arbitrary detention and
arrest, and prevent international conflict."24 Again, in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,25 Justice Blackmun dissented from
the Court's decision to uphold the U.S. policy of "intercepting
Haitian refugees on the high seas and summarily returning
17 Blackmun, supra note 12, at 6 (emphasis added).
18 Id.
1 Id.
20 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (509 U.S. 155, not in
reporter yet); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).21 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
22 Id. at 670. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was charged with the kidnapping, torture
and murder of a United States Drug Enforcement Administration [DEAl Agent. Id.
at 657. Subsequently, DEA agents forcibly abducted Dr. Alvarez-Machain from his
medical office in Mexico, and flew him by private plane to Texas where he was ar-
rested. Id. After a motion to dismiss the indictment, the federal district court held
that it did not have jurisdiction to try the doctor because his abduction violated the
U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty. Id. at 657-58. The Supreme Court, however, re-
versed, concluding that the treaty had not been violated, and declined to imply a
term to the treaty prohibiting international abductions. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
at 669.
23 Id. at 657.
24 Blackmun, supra note 12, at 6.
' 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (509 U.S. 155, not in reporter yet).
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them to Haiti."" According to Justice Blackmun, such a ruling
failed to respect the United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees27 by allowing "vulnerable refugees" to be re-
turned to a place of persecution.'
The remaining two cases, Thompson v. Oklahoma29 and
Stanford v. Kentucky," raised challenges to the execution of ju-
venile offenders. In Thompson, a plurality opinion ruled that
"'civilized standards of decency' embodied in the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibited" use of the death penalty against the juvenile
defendant. 1 By following the standard of many countries which
had outlawed juvenile capital punishment, the majority arrived
at a decision "consistent with international practice."32 In Stan-
ford, however, the majority held that regardless of the United
States' ratification of an international treaty explicitly prohibit-
ing juvenile death penalties, the execution of the juvenile defen-
dant was constitutionally valid.33 Justice Scalia distinguished
the case by "emphasiz[ing] that it is American conceptions of de-
cency that are dispositive, [and] rejecting the contention ... that
the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant."' Jus-
2" Blackmun, supra note 12, at 7; see Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that both treaty and statute precluded Government from forci-
bly returning refugees to peril). The United States Coast Guard had been ordered by
the President to intercept vessels unlawfully carrying passengers from Haiti to the
United States and repatriate those passengers to Haiti without first ascertaining
whether they were refugees. Id. at 2552. The Supreme Court concluded that no ex-
isting treaty or statute placed "any limit on the President's authority to repatriate
aliens interdicted beyond the territorial seas of the United States." Id. at 2567.
' United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
art. 33.1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, as incorporated in Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6233, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (providing
"[nlo Contracting State Shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever ... where his life or freedom would be threatened").
2' Blackmun, supra note 12, at 7; see Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that terms of Convention unambiguously state that "[viulnerable
refugees shall not be returned").
29 487 U.S. 815 (1987) (plurality opinion).
3' 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
31 Blackmun, supra note 12, at 8 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830).
32 Id.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368.
34 Id. at 369 n.1. "While '[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other de-
mocracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our
people is not merely an historical accident' ... they cannot serve to establish the first
Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)
1996]
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tice Brennan's dissent in Stanford noted that "[w]ithin the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile
crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved."35 After re-
ferring to the four cases previously discussed, Justice Blackmun
proffered that "unfortunately, the Supreme Court has shown
something less than 'a decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind."
36
III. SAUDIAARABIA V. NELSON
3 7
Although I will not discuss further the four cases cited by
Justice Blackmun, I would like to discuss a fifth case which also
raises human rights concerns and deals with the role of interna-
tional law in the adjudication of cases by domestic tribunals in
general, and the Supreme Court of the United States in particu-
lar. This case is Saudia Arabia v. Nelson,3' decided by the Su-
preme Court on March 23, 1993. In broad terms, the Nelson case
dealt with the interpretation of the United States Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act39 in a situation in which an American
plaintiff claimed to have been mistreated and tortured by a for-
eign sovereign." Even beyond the interpretation of a domestic
statute that deals with the immunity to be accorded a foreign
sovereign before domestic courts, the case reveals the extent to
which the courts are willing to give effect to universal legal
norms and fundamental principles of international law.
The facts of Nelson are clear and straightforward. One may
speak of "the facts," since the defendants moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, and, therefore, the facts as alleged by Nelson
are deemed to be true for purposes of the motion.4'
(Cardozo, J.))).
'5 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Blackmun, supra
note 12, at 8. "[T]he United States 'stands almost alone in the world in executing
offenders who were under 18 at the time of the crime."' Id. (referring to report of
Amnesty International).
36 Blackmun, supra note 12, at 6; see Jennie Hatfield-Lyon, Nelson v. Saudi
Arabia: An Opportunity for Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights
Standards, 86 AM. SOC' INT'L L. PROC. 331 passim (1992); Louis Henkin, A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 229 (1992).
7 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
38 Id.
'9 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-
1611 (1988)) [hereinafter "FSIA"].
40 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 352-53.
41 Id. at 351.
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The plaintiff, Scott Nelson, while in the United States, saw a
printed advertisement recruiting employees for the King Faisal
Specialist Hospital (the Hospital) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.42 The
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), an independent organi-
zation organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands, under
contract with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, conducted recruit-
ment in the United States of American employees for the Hospi-
tal.43 Nelson was recruited in the United States and subse-
quently interviewed by Hospital officials in Saudi Arabia." After
returning to Florida, Nelson was hired in the United States, and
entered into a contract of employment with the Hospital as a
monitoring systems engineer." The contract of employment was
executed in Miami, Florida, in 1983.46
In accordance with the Hospital's job description for a moni-
toring systems engineer, Nelson was responsible for "monitoring
all 'facilities, equipment, utilities and maintenance systems to
insure the safety of patients, hospital staff, and others.'"'47 Nel-
son's difficulties began when, in the performance of his duties, he
discovered certain safety hazards at the Hospital.4" After he re-
ported these safety hazards to an investigative commission of the
Saudi government, Nelson was summoned to the Hospital's se-
curity office.49 He alleged that he was subsequently taken to a
jail cell where agents of the Saudi Government "'shackled, tor-
tured, and bea[t]' him."
After his release and return to the United States, asserting
that the court had subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA,
Nelson sued Saudi Arabia, the Hospital and the Hospital's pur-
chasing agent, in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida.5 The FSIA provides that a "foreign state
Id. at 352.
4- Id. at 351-52.
4Id. at 352.
42 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 352.
'G Id. Note that the facts of Nelson's recruitment, particularly the activities in
the United States, were important to his claim because the Foreign Services Im-
munities Act, under which Nelson sought jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia, only con-
fers jurisdiction where an action is "based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
47 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 352 (citation omitted).
49 Id.
49 Id.
60 Id. at 353 (citation omitted).
"r See Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, No. 88-1791-CIV-NESBITT, 1989 WL 435302, at
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shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case ... in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state."52
The district court granted Saudi Arabia's motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the "link
between the recruitment activities and the [diefendants is not
sufficient to establish 'substantial contact' with the United
States" within the meaning of the commercial activity exception
of the FSIA 3 Moreover, the district court noted that, "even if
the court had determined that ... Saudi Arabia had carried on
commercial activities having substantial contact with the United
States through the indirect recruitment activities," there still
would not be a sufficient nexus between the activities and the
complaint to maintain the cause of action. 4
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that "the recruitment and hiring of Nelson in the United
States ... was a commercial activity of Saudi Arabia" having
"'substantial contact with the United States.'"5 As previously
mentioned, the recruitment of Nelson in the United States was
conducted by the HCA, a wholly owned subdidiary of an Ameri-
can Corporation, which in 1973 contracted with the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to recruit employees for the Hospital.56 The Court
of Appeals noted that the contract, which created an agency re-
lationship between the HCA and Saudi Arabia, empowered the
HCA to "'recruit and employ administrative ... and all other per-
sonnel with full authority to initially set and subsequently adjust
their salaries and other remuneration, to supervise such employ-
ees, and in its sole judgment, to terminate the employment of
any such personnel.'" 7
The Court of Appeals agreed with Nelson that the recruit-
ment and hiring in the United States constituted a commercial
activity, and that there was a "'jurisdictional nexus' between the
*1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 1989) (mem.).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
13 Nelson, 1989 WL 435302, at *2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1988) (providing
definition of commercial activity carried on in U.S. by foreign state as "having sub-
stantial contact with the United States").
Nelson, 1989 WL 435302, at *3-4.
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991).




acts for which damages [we]re sought, and the foreign sover-
eign's commercial activity.""8 The Court of Appeals also con-
cluded that the "detention and torture of Nelson [we]re so inter-
twined with his employment at the Hospital that they [weire
'based upon' his recruitment and hiring, in the United States, for
employment at the Hospital in Saudi Arabia."59 Hence, the
Court of Appeals reversed the district court because it found
Nelson's detention and torture directly attributable to the per-
formance of his duties under the employment contract.
Subsequent to the decision of the Eleventh Circuit, the De-
partment of State joined the defendants in urging a reconsidera-
tion en banc. 1 The Court of Appeals denied the request, and the
Executive Branch joined the defendants in their petition for cer-
tiorari before the Supreme Court. 2 Even before the granting of
the petition, the case had generated considerable media interest,
and the titles or headlines of the news items suggest their con-
tent.63 The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari on
June 8, 1992,and on March 23, 1993, reversed the Court of Ap-
peals and dismissed the plaintiffs case in its entirety.'
Justice Souter's opinion, which reversed the Court of Ap-
peals on the ground that Nelson's suit was not based on a com-
mercial activity, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas. The opinion stated:
Because we conclude that the suit is not based upon any com-
mercial activity by petitioners, we need not reach the issue of
substantial contact with the United States."
We do not mean to suggest that the first clause of § 1605(a)(2)
necessarily requires that each and every element of a claim be
Id. at 1534.
"Id. at 1535.
"Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1536.
"SaudiArabia v Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)
"Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 504 U.S. 972 (1992) (mem.) (granting cert.).
"See, e.g., U.S. Sides Against American in Lawsuit Over Saudi Actions,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, May 25, 1992, at 3A, Thomas W. Lippman, Workers' Tales of
Torture Strain U.S.-Saudi Ties, WASH. POST, May 24, 1992, at A8; Norman Kemp-
ster, Panel to Hear Charges of Saudi Torture, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at A6; Neil
A Lewis, U.S. Wants Saudi Torture Suit Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1991, at All;
Stephen Robinson, The Middle East: U.S. Prevents Claim Against Saudi Arabia,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 10, 1991, at 11.
"Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363.
"Id. at 356.
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commercial activity by a foreign state, and we do not address
the case where a claim consists of both commercial and sover-
eign elements. We do conclude, however, that where a claim
rests entirely upon activities sovereign in character ... jurisdic-
tion will not exist under that clause regardless of any connec-
tion the sovereign acts may have with commercial activity.'
Justice White's concurring opinion convincingly demonstrated
that Saudi Arabia was engaged in a commercial activity or
"commercial enterprise. "" In his words, "the state-owned
hospital was engaged in ordinary commercial business .... "68 In
"get[ting] even with a whistle blower," it did not matter to
Justice White whether the sovereign resorted to "thugs or
government officers to carry on its business."69 Yet, Justice
White concurred in the judgment of reversal because, in his
view, the commercial activity in the United States did not
constitute the commercial activity upon which Nelson's action
was based, and the commercial activity in Saudi Arabia, "though
constituting the basis of the Nelsons' suit, lacks a sufficient
nexus to the United States."7 °
Justices Blackmun and Kennedy, dissented in part, and
voted for a remand of the case on the "failure to warn" claims set
forth in the Nelson complaint." Justice Kennedy, with whom
Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined, stated that the counts of
failure to warn of foreseeable dangers "are based upon commer-
cial activity having substantial contact with the United States,"
since "they complain of a negligent omission made during the re-
cruiting of a hospital employee in the United States."72
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, set forth the reasons why he
voted for an affirmance of the Court of Appeals. In his view,
Justice White "demonstrated ... [that the] operation of the hospi-
tal and its employment practices and disciplinary procedures are
66 Id. at 358 n.4.
17 Id. at 365 (White, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 369 (White, J., concurring).
69Nelson, 507 U.S. at 368 (White, J., concurring) (stating that case should "turn
on whether sovereign is acting in a commercial capacity, not on whether it resorts to
thugs or government officers to carry on its business").
70 Id. at 370 (White, J., concurring).
71 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 370-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
72 Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73 Id. at 377-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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'commercial activities' within the meaning of the statute."74 Un-
like Justice White, however, Justice Stevens stated:
[Saudia Arabia's] commercial activities ... have sufficient con-
tact with the United States to justify the exercise of federal ju-
risdiction.... The position for which [Nelson] was recruited and
ultimately hired was that of a monitoring systems manager, a
troubleshooter, and, taking [his] allegations as true, it was pre-
cisely [Nelson's] performance of those responsibilities that led to
the hospital's retaliatory actions against him.
... If the same activities had been performed by a private busi-
ness, I have no doubt jurisdiction would be upheld. And that, of
course, should be a touchstone of our inquiry....'
In a brief review of the Nelson case, it was noted that "[s]ome
regular observers of the [FSIA] will no doubt be disappointed
that the Court in this case did not provide doctrinal clarification
of several of the obvious unresolved issues arising under the
[FSIA] ... failed to use this case as a vehicle for providing a
remedy in U.S. courts for intentional torts committed by foreign
states in their own territory."76  The reviewer, however,
concluded "that Justice Souter struck the right balance between
the competing considerations."77 Yet, in light of the Eleventh
Circuit decision, a move to amend the statute was initiated so as
to grant relief for intentional torts committed overseas.78 Surely,
"those interested in the expansion of human rights law," as well
as those who initiated the move to amend the statute, will not
agree that the majority struck the right balance.79
Following the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Nelson, the Judi-
ciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives
proposed certain amendments to the FSIA, 0 one of which would
74 Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 378-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"a Keith Highet et al., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act--commercial activity
exception-nature and purpose tests-police power as sovereign power, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 442,444 (1993).
"Id.
78 Id.
79 Edward D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27
AKRON L. REV. 281, 296 (1994) (quoting Highet & Kahale III, supra note 76, at 444).
8' See FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 900, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) (reporting amendments to bill relating to jurisdictional im-
munities of foreign states in certain tort cases and recommending that bill be passed
in amended form); FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP. No.
702, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994) (reporting added amendments to bill relating to
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grant U.S. courts jurisdiction over any case in which:
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death of a United States citizen occurring in such for-
eign state and caused by the torture or extrajudicial killing of
that citizen by such foreign state or by any official or employee
of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her
office or employment.8'
The Report noted that "[i]n recent years, several U.S. citizens
have been tortured abroad and have faced difficulties in
obtaining a remedy."" Conscious that State Department
intervention, or use of the Torture Victim Protection Act,83 might
not provide an effective remedy,"4 the Committee sought to
expand the circumstances under which an American who has
been subjected to torture by a foreign state may bring suit in
United States courts." Considering the limited remedies
jurisdictional immunities of foreign states in certain cases involving torture and ex-
trajudicial killing and recommending that bill be passed as amended).8 FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 900, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992). The proposed amendments contained in this Report were
intended to supplement and supersede a bill which was introduced in the House of
Representatives more than two years prior to the Nelson ruling to amend section
1605(a) of the FSIA. See H.R. 2357, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). H.R. 2357 proposed
a new section which would, as an exception to foreign sovereign immunity, grant
U.S. courts jurisdiction over conflicts in which:
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property, of a United States citizen employed
by such foreign state, occurring in such foreign state and caused by the
tortious act or omission of such foreign state or of any official or employee
of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office or
employment.
H.R. 2357 at 2. The essential difference between the original bill and the Committee
Report is that the Committee Report specifically deals with "torture or extrajudicial
killing." H.R. 900; see also H.R. REP. No. 702, supra note 80 (adding "act of geno-
cide" to extrajudicial killing and torture as additional exception to foreign sovereign
immunity).
82 H.R. REP. No. 900 at 3.
13 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). "An individual who, under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation ... subjects an individual to
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual ... ."Id.
84See H.R. REP. No. 900 at 3-4 ("State Department's familiar role of ... main-
taining foreign relations may conflict with its role of defending the rights of U.S.
citizens;" because "[t]VPA will not be available to all U.S. citizens who are tortured
abroad because in many cases the plaintiff may not be able to obtain personal juris-
diction over the individual torturers, or may not even know their identity").
8See text accompanying note 81. The Committee expressed the view that the
U.S. had abdicated its "moral responsibility to provide leadership in the area of hu-
man rights by undertaking efforts to extend the scope of international laws protect-
ing those rights." H.R. REP. No. 900 at 4. "[Aln action constituting a violation of set-
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available to victims of torture abroad, and the potential
deprivation of their "day in court," it would indeed be
appropriate for Congress seriously to consider amending the
FSIA so as to reflect the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.
86
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC COURTS
In the allegations of torture in the Nelson case, two points
should be noted. First, as a matter of international law, torture
should be included among a state's erga omnes"7 duties. Torture
is expressly condemned by Article 5 of the Universal Declara-
tion 8 and by the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. These obligations or duties which bind all nations
are well-recognized peremptory norms under the doctrines of
erga omnes and jus cogens.90
tled international law-in this case torture or extrajudicial killing-is no more ac-
ceptable when committed by a foreign government than by anyone else." Id.; see also
Highet & Kahale III, supra note 76, at 444 (commenting on "disappoint[ment] that
the [Supreme] Court failed to use [the Nelson] case as a vehicle for providing a rem-
edy in the U.S. courts for intentional torts committed by foreign states in their own
territory").
8' The proposed amendments were not enacted. The House Report on the bill to
which the amendments were to apply is H.R. 2357. (The complete bill tracking re-
port of H.R. 2357, the precursor to H.R. REP. No. 900, is available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, BLT102 File)
87 Erga omnes means the concern of all, and it has been used to describe a right
so important that all states have a legal interest in its protection. See Philip S.
Wellman, Human Rights, International Law, and the Federal Courts, 7 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 181 (1991) (reviewing KENNETH C. RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM (1991)). Wellman characterizes the
author's premise as one which envisions "an international legal system working be-
yond the traditional Westphalian boundaries and protecting all individual victims of
terrorist acts and human rights violations." Id. at 217.
"s See Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at 166 (stating that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
9 GA. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51 (1984), reprinted in 13
DUSAN J. DJoNovIcH, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY 395
(1988) [hereinafter "Torture Convention"]. Article two of the Torture Convention
provides that "[ejach State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, ju-
dicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its juris-
diction .... No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture." Torture Convention, Part I. art. 2, 13
DJONOVICH at 395.
" "Jus cogens is defined as law so compelling that it invalidates rules consented
to by states by treaty or custom and represents a core group of fundamental norms
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In addition to this first point of international law, a second
point that should be noted is that these international legal prin-
ciples are also relevant in interpreting domestic statutes.9'
Hence, quite apart from the views of scholars who strongly as-
sert that governments do not enjoy sovereign immunity when
they commit gross human rights violations,92 others would have
hoped that the FSIA would have been interpreted more in keep-
from which ... states may not deviate." Wellman, supra note 87, at 216 n.130. It has
also been likened to "a world public order not exclusively controlled by nation-states,
one that ... guard[s] the most fundamental and highly-valued interests of interna-
tional society." Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamen-
tal to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 587 (1988). A state which
"practices, encourages or condones" the following is in violation of international law:
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 702. But see Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Ar-
gentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Clearly, the FSIA does not specifically
provide for an exception to sovereign immunity based onjus cogens.").
91 See Judicial Education on International Law Committee of the Section of In-
ternational Law of the American Bar Association: Final Report, 24 INT' L LAW. 903,
907-08 (Fall 1990) [hereinafter "Final Report"]. "[International legal norms may
find their way into United States law ... when incorporated by reference in statutes
or by private parties in their dealings inter se, or when used by courts to inform the
content of otherwise ambiguous Constitutional or statutory provisions." Id. at 914
(footnote omitted).
92 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of
Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the
FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191 (1983). Those acts which
deprive foreign states and individuals of immunity include human rights violations,
genocide and international terrorism. Id. at 223-25. Paust contends that even viola-
tions of international law which occur entirely within a state's territorial boundaries
"are not immune to responsive action by or on behalf of the international commu-
nity." Id. at 222 (emphasis added). Paust has also contended that the very notion of
"sovereignty" is contingent upon obedience to, and respect for, international law.
Jordan J. Paust, Draft Brief Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and
Human Rights: Nonimmunity for Violators of International Law Under the FSIA, 8
HouS. J. INT'L L. 49, 59 (1985) [hereinafter "Paust, Draft Brief']. Accordingly,
"judicial deference to foreign state acts is rightly conditioned upon foreign state re-
spect for international law .... [An illegal act is incapable of protection by the judi-
ciary." Id. Furthermore, states will not enjoy immunity for illegal acts committed by
their agents or officials under the premise that such acts were "discretionary" in na-
ture. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980). Thus, the
Republic of Chile was denied sovereign immunity under FSIA section 1605(a)(5)(A)
in an action for the assassination of a former Chilean ambassador and foreign min-
ister. Id. But see Diab, supra note 1, at 335 (offering argument that human rights
concerns should "be left exclusively to the domestic legislation of a sovereign state").
Human rights "are not to be controlled through international agreement or moni-
tored by international tribunals." Id.
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ing with the Congressional intent of depoliticizing these deter-
minations in specific cases.93 As stated by a Canadian scholar:
"Indeed, the whole rationale for legislating the restrictive theory
[of sovereign immunity] in the first place was to give the Execu-
tive distance from the whole process to ensure less political,
more legal decisions."94 In the words of another scholar: "The
primary impetus for the passage of the FSIA was to transfer
adjudication of sovereign immunity issues from the Executive to
the Judiciary, to prevent bias and inconsistency, thus increasing
fairness both to plaintiffs and to sovereign defendants.""
It cannot be questioned that the two broad purposes of the
FSIA were to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
and to transfer the responsibility of determining the applicability
of sovereign immunity in specific cases from the executive to the
judicial branch." The legislative history of the bill, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 97 sets forth the constitutional
authority for the enactment of the legislation. In the discussion
of section 1602, entitled "Findings and Declaration of Purpose,"
it is expressly stated:
[D]ecisions on claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity
are best made by the judiciary on the basis of a statutory regime
which incorporates standards recognized under international
law.
Although the general concept of sovereign immunity appears to
be recognized in international law, its specific content and ap-
plication have generally been left to the courts of individual na-
tions. There is, however, a wide acceptance of the so-called re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity; that is, that the
sovereign immunity of foreign states should be "restricted" to
cases involving acts of a foreign state which are sovereign or
governmental in nature, as opposed to acts which are either
commercial in nature or those which private persons normally
9 See, e.g., Hatfield-Lyon, supra note 36, at 336 (suggesting that since premise
of creating exceptions to sovereign immunity was to allow non-political, legal reso-
lutions of claims, FSIA should be construed as such).
9 Hatfield-Lyon, supra note 36, at 336 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983)).
Joan Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrier to Human Rights Litigation-Is
Amendment Necessary and Possible?, 86 AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 338, 344
(1992) (citation omitted).
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perform.9'
In signing the legislation, President Ford stated:
This statute will also make it easier for our citizens and foreign
governments to turn to the courts to resolve ordinary legal dis-
putes. In this respect, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
carries forward a modern and enlightened trend in interna-
tional law. And it makes this development in the law available
to all American citizens.9
The "modern and enlightened trend" to which the President
referred is the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.0 0 The
basic premise of this theory is that, in commercial matters,
termed by the President "ordinary legal disputes," a foreign
sovereign no longer enjoys the defense of sovereign immunity.'
It was foreseen by the legislature that the issue to be resolved by
the courts was the meaning of the words "commercial activity."
10 2
The statute was intended to define "commercial activity" as:
including a broad spectrum of endeavor, from an individual
commercial transaction or act to a regular course of commercial
98 H.R. REP. No. 1487 at 14, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6613 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
99 Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 33 (1978) (citation omitted).
'0o Id. at 33. The United States first contemplated a restrictive policy of grant-
ing immunity for "foreign government-owned and government-operated vessels" in
1948. Edward D. Re, Nationalization and the Investment of Capital Abroad, 42 GEO.
L.J. 44, 60 (1953-54) (footnote omitted). This restrictive theory of immunity was
formally adopted by the Department of State in 1952. Id. at 60-61. See Jack B. Tate,
Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Govern-
ments, letter to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman by the Departmenfs
Acting Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate, 26 DEPIT ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter "Tate
Letter"]. Under this new restrictive theory of immunity, foreign states and their in-
strumentalities were to remain free from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts "with regard
to [their] sovereign or public acts (jure imperil) ... but not with respect to private
acts (jure gestionis)." Id. When the Tate Letter was issued, at which time the execu-
tive branch was still making determinations about whether a foreign government
would be entitled to immunity from suit, the State Department announced a policy
of advising the Attorney General of its position in each case, so that the government
could be better represented before the courts. See id. at 985.
10 Von Mehren, supra note 99, at 33.
102 H.R. REP. No. 1487 at 16, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615 (stating that "[tihe
courts would have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a 'commercial ac-
tivity' for the purposes of [FSIA]"); see Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against
Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. of Administrative Law
and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 56, 53 (1976) (recognizing inability to delineate between commercial and gov-




conduct. A "regular course of commercial conduct" includes the
carrying on of a commercial enterprise such as a mineral ex-
traction company, an airline or a state trading corporation.
Certainly, if an activity is customarily carried on for profit, its
commercial nature could readily be assumed. At the other end
of the spectrum, a single contract, if of the same character as a
contract which might be made by a private person, could consti-
tute a "particular transaction or act."1"
House Report 94-1487 clearly envisaged that the courts would
have considerable "latitude" in determining what constitutes a
commercial activity, and thought it "unwise to attempt an
excessively precise definition of this term, even if that were
practicable.""°  The House Report, nonetheless, does furnish
examples:
Activities such as a foreign government's sale of a service or a
product, its leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its em-
ployment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public re-
lations or marketing agents, or its investment in a security of an
American corporation, would be among those included within
the definition."'
Having established that the FSIA embodies certain international
legal norms, our discussion will now consider the role of domestic
courts in effectuating these norms.
V. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
Reverting to the role of the courts, and that of the United
States Supreme Court in particular, I should like to quote from
an ABA Committee Report on Judicial Education on Interna-
tional Law, which observed that:
the applicability of international legal norms in specific cases
may be, and frequently is, limited by the considerations of ju-
risdiction, equity and due process that bear upon all proceedings
before U.S. courts. A decent respect for the opinions of man-
kind, however, as well as for our own judicial traditions, de-
mands that such considerations not be invoked merely to dis-
guise an unwillingness to accord international legal norms their
rightful place in our legal system."
103 H.R. REP. No. 1487 at 17, 1976 U.S.C.C.A-N. at 6604.
'o H.R. REP. No. 1487 at 16, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615.
105 Id.
... Final Report, supra note 91, at 914-15.
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The last sentence from the ABA Committee report, i.e., "an
unwillingness to accord international legal norms their rightful
place in our legal system,""7 is the great concern of lawyers and
scholars who assert that international law is indeed part of the
law of the land."8 These concerns ought also to be the concerns
of judges.
In the Nelson case, a question deserving consideration was
whether the commercial activity exception provision of the FSIA
could properly be interpreted in a manner that would be faithful
to the expressed legislative intent, and, at the same time, would
give effect to the international legal standard that condemns tor-
ture.109 Counsel for the Saudi government asserted, in a law re-
view article, that the Nelson case neither involved a question of
international law, nor was a human rights case."0 Such an as-
sertion is surely strained, if not fanciful, in a case brought
against a foreign sovereign where the plaintiff sues for injuries
sustained as a result of torture inflicted by the foreign sovereign.
Regardless of labels, the question was whether, in the interpre-
tation and application of the FSIA, it would have been reason-
able and proper to interpret the FSIA in keeping with the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity, and in accordance with
principles of international law."' Hence, it would be pertinent to
determine whether acts of torture and detention are "peculiarly
sovereign in nature""' (and thus entitled to immunity), and
107 Id. at 915.
108 Id.
lo Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359-61 (1993). The Nelson Court relied
in part on the narrow construction of "commercial activity" adopted by the court in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992). Nelson, 507 U.S. at 359. In
Weltover, the issue was "whether the particular actions that the foreign state per-
forms (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private
party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce .... ' Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
. Everett C. Johnson Jr., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson: The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act in Perspective, 16 HOUS. J. INTL L. 291 (1993) (stating Nelson is simply
case of construing statutory construction of FSIA). Johnson regards the Supreme
Court's decision as a "testament to judicial restraint" in that it declined to read the
FSIA more broadly to cover alleged human rights violations. Id. at 304. He states
that although a broader range of remedies might be made available to plaintiffs
through expanded U.S. jurisdiction over human rights cases, the FSIA was specifi-
cally designed to eliminate remedies under certain conditions. Id. at 292-93
(emphasis added).
. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 361.
1 Id. The Supreme Court's rationale hinged on its conviction that "a foreign
state's exercise of the power of its police has long been understood" as being unique
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whether the U.S. courts have jurisdiction under FSIA over cases
which involve violations of international legal norms.' In hypo-
thetical terms, if, in conducting a "commercial activity," a defen-
dant foreign sovereign violates an established international
norm, would not the defendant be liable? Of course, one would
hope that the court would not seek the escape of determining
that there was no "commercial activity," and thereby conclude
that it had no jurisdiction. Surely, it would be sad indeed to
conclude that it had no jurisdiction; that a determination was
made "merely to disguise an unwillingness to accord interna-
tional legal norms their rightful place in our legal system.""'
In discussing the power and duty of the courts to interpret
constitutional provisions and statutes, in the United States one
must remember the special role of the courts under Article III of
the Constitution. It is this third Article and the doctrine and
practice of judicial review that give a very special role to all
judges appointed under Article III, and to the Supreme Court in
particular."' Given the fact that U.S. courts have historically in-
terpreted and applied international law in the adjudication of
disputes,"' judges might arguably have an even greater respon-
sibility to exercise their constitutionally granted authority over
matters in which international human rights have been vio-
to sovereigns, regardless of how "monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be." Id.
Justice White, however, found it "self-evident ... [that] warning an employee when
he blows the whistle and taking retaliatory action, such as harassment, involuntary
transfer, discharge, or other tortious behavior, although not prototypical commercial
acts, are certainly well within the bounds of commercial activity." Id. at 365 (White,
J., concurring). See also Remarks by Jordan J. Paust in International Human
Rights in American Courts: The Case of Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, in 86 AM. SOc'Y.
INT'L. L. PROC. 324, 327 (1992) (stating that "in no way can torture rightly be con-
sidered a legitimate or protectable ... 'sovereign' activity").
... See Hatfield-Lyon, supra note 36, at 337. "The purpose of governmental ac-
tivity in a free and democratic society cannot be interpreted to include the violation
of human rights; it must, rather, be interpreted so as to protect and preserve them."
Id. (footnote omitted); see also generally Paust, Draft Brief, supra note 92, at 57-61
(discussing nonimmunity for governments which violate international human
rights).
.. Final Report, supra note 91, at 915.
" See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (enumerating the types of cases over which U.S.
courts exercise jurisdiction). Article III courts may hear "all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under ... the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under
their Authority ... [as well as cases] between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Id. The Supreme Court has original jurisdic-
tion over "Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," and
appellate jurisdiction over cases mentioned in section two, clause one. Id.
" See supra notes 11 and 91 and accompanying text.
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lated.11'
It is true, of course, that all officers of government, legisla-
tive, executive and judicial, "shall be bound by Oath or Affirma-
tion, to support [the] Constitution.""8 Elected and appointed of-
ficials, however, do not enjoy the absolute immunity of judges,
and are not insulated as are the judges. Only the judges are
granted a special independence which, as a practical matter,
guarantees a life tenure subject only to removal by impeachment
under extraordinary circumstances."' This express constitu-
tional conferral of judicial independence is for the benefit of the
people, that is, the litigants. Its purpose is to remove the judicial
power from the "vicissitudes of political controversy" and the
clamor of the moment.'20 Perhaps the best expression of this
thought is found in a statement by Justice Jackson, who de-
clared:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to estab-
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.'2'
117 See Hatfield-Lyon, supra note 36, at 337. "A court that does not meaningfully
consider the international human rights of its government is giving a judicial over-
ride to these obligations, thereby violating international laws and denying justice."
Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Hatfield-Lyon urges that American courts follow
the Canadian approach to international human rights cases and adopt a human
rights exception to immunity under the FSIA. Id. at 333-36.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
119 See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1993). Any person may
submit a written complaint to the clerk of the appellate court regarding conduct of a
federal judge which is "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of
the business of the courts," or a judge's alleged inability "to discharge all the duties
of office by reason of mental or physical disability ... ." Id. § 372(c)(1). Ultimately,
the Judicial Conference of the United States may recommend to the House of Rep-
resentatives that the judge be impeached, upon which the House of Representatives
may take "whatever action [it] considers to be necessary." Id. § 372(c)(8)(B). See
section 372(c) in its entirety for the procedure used in conducting investigations; see
also Edward D. Re, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Judicial Coun-
cils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 8 No. KY. L. REV. 221,
242-54, appendix (1981) (discussing procedure for investigation of judicial miscon-
duct in detail).




The doctrine and practice of judicial review has given the
American Constitution and its Bill of Rights special status as
living documents in securing the rights of the people against
governmental abuse. Notwithstanding occasional lapses, it
cannot be denied that the Supreme Court has not only given
meaning and vitality to the ideals set forth in the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, but it has also expanded upon the notions
of life and liberty enshrined in those documents." Over the
course of our history, the exceptions and lapses are indeed few
when compared to the expansion that has resulted by including
within those concepts prohibitions against a variety of forms of
discrimination, freedom of association, rights of privacy and a
host of other rights deemed to be fundamental.
VI. CONCLUSION
One cannot conclude any treatment of a subject which deals
with human rights and international law in domestic courts
without invoking the preamble to the Constitution, which pro-
claims that its purpose is to "form a more perfect Union" and
"establish Justice."123 To these inspiring words it is added that
the Constitution was also ordained and established to "secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."24 It
cannot be doubted that a motivating purpose was the enjoyment
and expansion of the concept of liberty. Clearly, it was the hope
that "justice" would be construed to attain and not to restrict the
'4 See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho. v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 281-85 (1922) (entitling Chi-
nese nationals admitted into United States, upon habeas corpus petition, to judicial
hearing to adjudicate claim of citizenship). The Fifth Amendment affords "protection
in its guarantee of due process of law" to those faced with "loss of both property and
life ... or of all that makes life worth living." Id. at 284-85; Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing claim-
ant's private cause of action under Fourth Amendment against federal agents for
unlawful search and seizure). "[T]here is no safety for the citizen, except in the pro-
tection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded by the officers of
the government, professing to act in its name.'" Id. at 394-95 (quoting United States
v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219 (1882)) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has ensured
that "lait a minimum, a deprivation of life, liberty, or property must be accompanied
by 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" Ed-
ward D. Re, Due Process, Judicial Review, and the Rights of the Individual, 39
CLEV. STATE L. REv. 1, 9 (1991) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
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full enjoyment of the blessings of liberty. To give meaning to
those words, an independent judiciary must effectuate, and, in-
deed, when possible, enlarge and expand upon those human
rights that have become universally accepted as indispensable to
the dignity of all people.
Justice Blackmun, in his thoughtful address, borrowed the
words "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" from the
first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence."n These
powerful words, invoked by Thomas Jefferson, ought to continue
to guide the actions of all public officials, and judges in particu-
lar. Hence, evaluated against this standard of "a decent respect
to the opinions of mankind," Justice Blackmun concluded his
thoughtful speech by quoting Professor Henkin, who remarked
that "'almost all nations observe almost all principles of interna-
tional law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time.""26 Justice Blackmun added: "Unfortunately, as the cases I
have cited illustrate, the Supreme Court's own recent record in
the area is somewhat more qualified. I would say that, at best,
the present Supreme Court enforces some principles of interna-
tional law and some of its obligations some of the time."
127
Indeed, there is much food for thought in Justice Blackmun's
concluding words. He stated:
I have been serving on the federal bench for 34 years. During
that time, the United States has become economically and po-
litically intertwined with the rest of the world as never before.
International human rights conventions-still a relatively new
idea when I came to the bench in 1959-have created for na-
tions mutual obligations that are accepted throughout the
world. As we approach the 100th anniversary of The Paquete
Habana ... it perhaps is appropriate to remind ourselves that
now, more than ever, "international law is part of our law" and
is entitled to the respect of our domestic courts. Although the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court do not offer much hope
for the immediate future, I look forward to the day when the
Supreme Court, too, will inform its opinions almost all the time
with a decent respect to the opinions of mankind. 128
I share Justice Blackmun's hope for the future and conclude by
'25 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
12' Blackmun, supra note 12, at 8 (quoting Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS
BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979)).
127 Blackmun, supra note 12, at 8.
128 Id. at 8-9.
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expressing the thought that courts cannot be oblivious to the
consequences of judicial decisions that ignore international
human rights, and, by inaction or restrictive statutory
interpretation, tolerate or permit their violation. In the
application of constitutional guarantees, and in the
interpretation of laws that affect human rights, the Supreme
Court can neither abandon nor restrict its special role as
guardian of the Constitution and protector of fundamental
human rights.

